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Kenneth	Veitch	
	
Introduction	
	
This	chapter’s	objective	is	to	highlight,	and	think	through,	the	role	of	obligation	in	comprehending	social	
rights	 in	the	context	of	the	changing	nature	of	the	welfare	state.	There	are	two	reasons	for	this	focus.	
The	first	concerns	the	‘social’	dimension	of	social	rights.	References	to	social	rights	often	assume	one	of	
two	meanings.	On	the	one	hand,	the	‘social’	denotes	a	series	of	fundamental	goods	that	human	beings	
need	access	to	in	order	to	live:	a	home,	health	care,	an	education,	and	security	of	income,	for	example.	
Collectively,	those	goods	enable	the	construction	of	a	social	existence.	On	the	other	hand,	the	‘social’	of	
social	rights	gains	its	meaning	via	a	comparison	of	social	rights	with	civil	and	political	rights.	In	contrast	
to	the	latter	types	of	rights	–	which	are	often	characterised	as	negative	forms	of	rights,	encapsulating	a	
right	of	 freedom	from	state	 interference	–	social	 rights	are	 identified	as	pointing	to	claims	against	the	
state;	they	demand	state	intervention	in	order	to	promote	positive	exercises	of	freedom.	Moreover,	it	is	
often	 argued	 that	 social	 rights	 precede	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	meaningful	 exercise	 of	 civil	 and	 political	
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rights.	 What	 use	 are	 the	 latter	 forms	 of	 rights,	 it	 is	 suggested,	 if,	 for	 example,	 one	 lacks	 a	 basic	
education?	In	this	second	sense,	then,	the	‘social’	of	social	rights	finds	its	meaning	by	its	location	within	
a	classificatory	model	of	rights	–	specifically	that	proposed	by	T	H	Marshall	in	his	essay	‘Citizenship	and	
Social	Class’	(Marshall	1992).	
	
This	chapter’s	focus	on	obligation	advances	a	different	kind	of	engagement	with	the	‘social’	dimension	
of	 social	 rights	 by	 shifting	 the	 focus	 towards	 the	 form	 of	 social	 relations	 that	 might	 be	 thought	 to	
underpin	 social	 rights	at	different	 stages	 in	 their	history.	To	put	 it	another	way,	an	exploration	of	 the	
types	of	obligations,	or	duties,	of	citizenship	accompanying	social	rights	has	the	potential	to	reveal	the	
prevailing	principles	or	political	philosophy	that	guides	social	rights.	
	
The	second	reason	for	this	chapter’s	focus	on	obligation	is	to	draw	attention	to	the	fact	that	social	rights	
are	not	necessarily	given	–	provisions	that	appear	in,	and	can	simply	be	read	off,	international	covenants	
or	 countries’	 constitutions;	 rather,	 social	 rights	 are	 fostered	 or	 developed	 –	 they	 emerge	 as	 the	 end	
point	of	a	process	that,	it	is	argued	here,	must	be	investigated	if	we	are	to	understand	their	nature	and	
meaning.	 Part	 of	 that	 process	 is	 the	 realisation	 that	 (social)	 rights	 are	 structured	 by	 obligations;	 that	
there	 is	 a	 real	 sense	 in	 which	 obligations	 precede	 (social)	 rights.	 If	 this	 is	 so,	 then	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	
explore	 the	precise	nature	of	 the	 types	of	obligation	 that	 structure	social	 rights.	 In	 the	context	of	 the	
welfare	state,	 this	 leads	to	a	concern	with	the	duties	of	citizenship,	and	especially	with	understanding	
their	nature	and	how,	and	why,	 that	nature	might	have	shifted	over	 time.	What,	 for	 instance,	are	 the	
political,	economic,	and	social	factors	and	exigencies	that	shape	the	obligations	or	duties	of	citizenship	
in	the	context	of	welfare?	To	what	ends	are	those	obligations	directed?	These	are	the	kinds	of	questions	
that	 animate	 this	 chapter’s	 analysis.	 In	 summary,	 the	 claim	 made	 here	 is	 that	 social	 rights	 can	 be	
understood	fully	only	if	the	obligations	that	structure	them	are	the	subject	of	detailed	analysis.	
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As	 a	 comprehensive	 treatment	 of	 how	 those	 themes	 play	 out	 across	 the	 various	 fields	 of	 welfare	 is	
impossible	 within	 one	 chapter,	 I	 have	 chosen	 to	 contextualise	 the	 discussion	 by	 reference	 to	
unemployment	 policy	 in	 Britain.	 The	 first	 section	 focuses	 upon	 Sir	 William	 Beveridge’s	 1942	 Report	
Social	Insurance	and	Allied	Services	–	considered	to	be	the	founding	document	of	the	post-WWII	British	
welfare	state	–	and	Marshall’s	 seminal	essay,	mentioned	above.	 In	 relation	to	 the	Report,	 this	section	
considers,	 inter	alia,	what	Beveridge	meant	by	‘right’;	the	nature	of	the	duties	he	envisaged;	and	what	
kinds	 of	 principles	 underpinned	 his	 recommendation	 of	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 compulsory	 form	 of	 social	
insurance.	 Insofar	 as	 Marshall’s	 essay	 is	 concerned,	 the	 discussion	 will	 look	 at	 his	 notion	 of	 social	
citizenship,	 and	 particularly	 at	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 rights	 and	 duties	 this	 entailed.	 The	 chapter	 then	
proceeds	to	an	analysis	of	some	recent	thinking	on	the	contemporary	nature	of	social	rights	–	including	
that	of	 ‘third	way’	proponents	and	their	critics.	Of	course,	the	discourse	of	 ‘rights	and	responsibilities’	
has	 been	 central	 to	 ‘third	 way’	 ideas	 about	 how	 to	 reform	 the	 welfare	 state	 and,	 practically,	 to	 the	
formulation	of	social	policies	devised	by	politicians	and	leaders	subscribing	to	this	form	of	thinking.	But	
rather	than	simply	rehearsing	this	well-trodden	terrain,	the	main	aim	of	the	chapter’s	second	section	is	
to	identify	a	correlation	between	some	of	the	key	themes	and	principles	in	Beveridge’s	Report	and	those	
emphasised	 by	 advocates	 of	 the	 ‘third	 way’.	 After	 illustrating	 how	 those	 themes	 have	 influenced	
contemporary	academic	analysis	of	social	rights	and	their	underlying	form	of	social	relations,	it	is	argued	
that	 a	 more	 convincing	 diagnosis	 of	 these	 highlights	 the	 need	 to	 adapt	 to	 the	 exigencies	 of	
contemporary	 capitalism	 and	 the	 labour	 market.	 Thus,	 key	 themes	 and	 objectives	 of	 contemporary	
social	policy	–	including	the	development	of	human	capital,	the	fostering	of	entrepreneurial	activity,	and	
the	focus	on	individual	responsibility	–	align	with	the	needs	and	exigencies	of	today’s	labour	market	and	
markets	generally,	rather	than	being	driven	by	a	logic	of	protection	against	the	vicissitudes	of	capitalism.	
The	 chapter’s	 third	 section	 looks	 at	 contemporary	 British	 unemployment	 policy	 and,	 specifically,	
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workfare,	 together	with	 a	 Supreme	 Court	 case	 in	which	 the	 claimants	 challenged	 the	 legality	 of	 two	
workfare	 schemes.	 The	 analysis	 in	 this	 section	 charts	 the	 shifting	 contours	 of	 social	 rights	 and,	
importantly,	their	underlying	obligations	by	juxtaposing	workfare	with	the	earlier	analysis	of	Beveridge’s	
Report	and	Marshall’s	essay.	The	overriding	argument	 is	 that,	while	there	may	be	overlapping	themes	
and	principles	between	the	two	eras,	the	differences	are	crucial	and	point	to	very	different	notions	of	
obligation	and	visions	of	the	social.	
 
Beveridge	and	Marshall	
	
Sir	William	Beveridge’s	 Report	 on	Social	 Insurance	 and	Allied	 Services,	 published	 in	 1942,	 is	 generally	
considered	to	be	 the	constitutive	document	of	 the	British	welfare	state.	The	Report	can	be	viewed	as	
having	had	two	overriding	objectives.	First,	and	famously,	its	aim	was	to	abolish	what	Beveridge	termed	
Want.	This	referred	to	a	phenomenon	experienced	by	many	individuals	and	families	in	British	cities	prior	
to	the	outbreak	of	WWII	–	namely,	the	lack	of	means	necessary	for	subsistence.	This	was	predominantly	
due	 to	 unemployment	 (‘interruption	 or	 loss	 of	 earning	 power’),	 and	 Beveridge’s	 Report	 was	 largely	
concerned	with	devising	a	suitable	way	by	which	to	tackle	Want.	The	main	mechanism	proposed	was	a	
scheme	 of	 compulsory	 social	 insurance.1	 Under	 this	 scheme,	 individuals	 would	 make	 weekly	
contributions	from	their	earnings	to	a	State	insurance	fund	and	be	able	to	draw	benefits	from	it,	up	to	
subsistence	level	and	irrespective	of	means,	when,	inter	alia,	unemployed,	ill,	in	the	event	of	becoming	
disabled,	 and	 upon	 retirement.	 In	 other	 words,	 access	 to	 the	 fund	 would	 be	 dependent	 on	 having	
contributed	to	it.	The	Report’s	second	objective	was	to	streamline	and	simplify	the	existing	patchwork	of	
social	 insurance	schemes,	the	different	principles	upon	which	they	operated,	and	their	administration.	
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The	 existing	 setup	 had	 become	 too	 costly	 to	 run	 and	 also	 too	 complex	 to	 navigate	 for	 those	 it	 was	
meant	to	serve.	
	
For	present	purposes,	two	important	questions	arise:	first,	do	we	encounter	a	discourse	of	social	rights	
within	 the	 Beveridge	 Report;	 and,	 secondly,	 what	 type	 of	 political	 philosophy	 underlies	 the	 Report’s	
proposals?	Insofar	as	the	former	is	concerned,	while	the	discourse	of	“social	rights”	per	se	is	absent	from	
the	Report,	Beveridge	does	occasionally	 speak	of	 ‘right’.	 This,	however,	only	applies	 in	 the	 context	of	
one’s	 right	 to	 draw	 from	 the	 social	 insurance	 fund	 to	 which	 one	 has	 contributed.	 As	 well	 as	
unemployment	benefit,	this	can	be	seen	in	relation	to	the	Report’s	proposal	to	move	from	a	system	of	
pensions	 based	 on	 need	 to	 one	 in	 which	 ‘pensions	 are	 paid	 as	 of	 right	 to	 all	 citizens	 in	 virtue	 of	
contribution.’	(Beveridge	1942,	para.	16)	Under	the	Report,	then,	‘right’	 is	 inextricably	linked	to	having	
made	a	contribution;	social	rights,	if	we	call	them	such	for	the	moment,	are	predominantly	the	rights	or	
entitlements	 of	 individuals	 who	 have	 been,	 but	 are	 now	 no	 longer,	 employed.	 Social	 rights	 are	 the	
individual	 rights	 of	 contributors	 to	 monetary	 benefits	 in	 hard	 times	 –	 benefits	 that	 replace	 missing	
income	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 Want	 and	 the	 symptoms	 associated	 with	 this.	 As	 such,	 the	 Report’s	
proposals	for	a	compulsory	social	insurance	scheme	are	equated	to	individual	contribution	‘rather	than	
free	allowances	from	the	State’.	
	
Secondly,	what	can	be	said	of	the	political	philosophy	underpinning	the	proposed	reforms	and	the	right	
to	 benefits	 associated	 with	 compulsory	 social	 insurance?	 Harris’s	 comment	 that	 the	 Report	 ‘was	 a	
complex	mixture	of	traditional	Edwardian	liberalism	and	wartime	collectivism’	provides	an	accurate	and	
useful	starting	point	(Harris	2004,	p.	290).	On	the	one	hand,	Beveridge’s	desire	to	abolish	Want	was	very	
much	 bound	 up	with	 the	 ongoing	war	 at	 the	 time	 and,	 in	 particular,	 with	 drawing	 on	 the	 perceived	
collectivism	across	the	nation	as	the	basis	for	the	proposals	for	a	new	social	security	system.	Although	
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not	 stated	 as	 a	 guiding	 principle	 of	 the	 Report’s	 recommendations,	 it	 is	 clear	 from	 the	 following	
quotation	that	the	notion	of	solidarity	played	a	role	in	grounding	the	new	system:	
	
The	proposals	of	the	Report	mark	another	step	forward	to	the	development	of	State	insurance	
as	a	new	 type	of	human	 institution,	differing	both	 from	 the	 former	methods	of	preventing	or	
alleviating	distress	 and	 from	voluntary	 insurance.	 The	 term	“social	 insurance”	 to	describe	 this	
institution	implies	both	that	it	is	compulsory	and	that	men	stand	together	with	their	fellows.	The	
term	 implies	 a	 pooling	 of	 risks	 except	 so	 far	 as	 separation	 of	 risks	 serves	 a	 social	 purpose	
(Beveridge	1942,	para.	26).	
	
For	 Beveridge,	 compulsory	 social	 insurance	 marked	 a	 shift	 from	 earlier	 forms	 of	 State	 insurance	 in	
Britain.	Those	earlier	forms	operated	on	the	principle	underlying	voluntary	insurance	–	namely,	that	of	
adjusting	premiums	to	particular	risks,	rather	than	the	pooling	of	risks,	which	was	to	be	the	underlying	
principle	of	 the	Report’s	proposed	scheme.	Solidarity	can	also	be	detected,	 inter	alia,	 in	 the	scheme’s	
universal	 nature,	 which	 was	 to	 extend	 beyond	 those	 currently	 covered	 –	 manual	 workers	 –	 to	
encompass	all	citizens	irrespective	of	their	 level	of	 income;	in	its	provision	of	a	flat	rate	of	subsistence	
benefit	to	all	those	insured	and	the	existence	of	a	flat	rate	of	contribution;	and	in	the	principle	of	sharing	
the	cost	of	social	security	amongst	the	insured	individual,	his	or	her	employer,	and	the	State.	Thus,	social	
security	was	 to	be	 achieved	 through	 cooperation	between	 the	 State	 and	 the	 individual	 –	what	Grady	
identifies	as	‘a	relationship	characterised	by	joint	responsibility’	(Grady	2010,	p.	164).	
	
On	the	other	hand,	a	liberal	form	of	social	relations	can	be	detected	within	the	Report.	Building	on	the	
principle	that	State	social	security	should	be	granted	on	the	basis	of	citizens’	service	and	contribution,	by	
limiting	 benefits	 to	 subsistence	 levels	 the	 Report	 sought	 to	 encourage	 individuals	 to	 take	 steps	 to	
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enhance	 their	 social	 security	 through	 voluntary	 action.	 State	 security,	 it	 was	 said,	 ‘should	 not	 stifle	
incentive,	 opportunity,	 responsibility’.	 Part	 of	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 new	 social	 insurance	 system	 was	
therefore	 to	promote	 individual	 freedom	and	 responsibility	 for	one’s	own	security;	 State	 security	was	
not	only	designed	to	abolish	Want	–	although,	crucially,	this	was	 its	main	aim	–	but	also	to	 incentivise	
individuals	by	providing	them	with	just	enough,	and	no	more,	for	them	to	want,	and	seek,	to	achieve	a	
heightened	 level	of	social	security	through	the	exercise	of	their	own	initiative.	Those	themes	resonate	
with	 other	 liberal	 principles	 running	 throughout	 the	 Report	 and	 which	 can	 clearly	 be	 seen	 from	 the	
following	quotation	that	appears	under	the	heading	‘Planning	for	Peace	in	War’:	
	
There	are	some	to	whom	pursuit	of	security	appears	to	be	a	wrong	aim.	They	think	of	security	as	
something	inconsistent	with	initiative,	adventure,	personal	responsibility.	That	is	not	a	just	view	
of	 social	 security	 as	 planned	 in	 this	 Report.	 The	 plan	 is	 not	 one	 for	 giving	 to	 everybody	
something	 for	nothing	and	without	trouble,	or	something	that	will	 free	the	recipients	 for	ever	
thereafter	 from	personal	 responsibilities.	The	plan	 is	one	 to	 secure	 income	 for	 subsistence	on	
condition	 of	 service	 and	 contribution	 and	 in	 order	 to	 make	 and	 keep	 men	 fit	 for	 service.	 It	
cannot	 be	 got	 without	 thought	 and	 effort.	 It	 can	 be	 carried	 through	 only	 by	 a	 concentrated	
determination	of	the	British	democracy	to	free	itself	once	for	all	of	the	scandal	of	physical	want	
for	which	there	is	no	economic	or	moral	justification	(Beveridge	1942,	para.	455).	
	
To	the	extent	that	one	can	conceptualise	Beveridge’s	system	of	social	insurance	in	a	discourse	of	social	
rights,	 it	 is	suggested	that	what	underpins	the	right	 to	pecuniary	benefits	 is	an	 idea	of	social	 relations	
based	upon	duty,	individual	responsibility,	effort,	and	reciprocity.	The	key	duty	is	to	engage	in	paid	work,	
as	it	is	this	that	produces	the	contributions	that	are	the	condition	of	access	to	the	benefits	of	the	social	
insurance	 fund.	While	 solidarity	 (in	 the	 sense	of	a	pooling	of	 risks)	 is,	 as	we	saw	above,	an	 important	
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feature	 of	 the	 proposed	 scheme,	 as	 Harris	 notes	 Beveridge’s	 aim	 was	 ‘not	 to	 redistribute	 income	
between	 classes,	 but	 ‘between	 times	of	 earning	 and	not	 earning,	 and	between	 times	of	 heavy	 family	
responsibilities	and	of	light	or	no	family	responsibilities’.’	(Harris	2004,	p.	290,	quoting	the	Report).	Thus,	
the	type	of	solidarity	involved	in	the	context	of	social	insurance	here	was	not	one	designed	to	promote	
an	equitable	or	fair	allocation	of	resources	or	wealth	across	the	various	classes	in	society.	The	centrality	
of	 duty	 can	 also	 be	 found	 in	 the	 conditionality	 attaching	 to	 the	 receipt	 of	 different	 types	 of	 benefit.	
Thus,	 while	 unemployment	 benefit	 will	 continue	 throughout	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 period	 of	
unemployment,	it	will	usually	be	conditional	upon	attendance	at	a	work	or	training	centre	after	a	certain	
amount	 of	 time.	 Similarly,	 the	 ongoing	 receipt	 of	 disability	 benefit	 would	 be	 conditional	 upon	 the	
‘imposition	of	special	behaviour	conditions’.	
	
In	 summary,	 the	 ‘social	 right’	 to	 access	 the	 funds	 of	 the	 new	 social	 insurance	 system	posited	 both	 a	
collective	and	liberal	vision	of	social	relations.	Regarding	the	former,	social	insurance	involved	the	duty	
to	participate	 in	 paid	work	 and,	 through	 that,	 to	 contribute	 to	 a	 common	 fund	 that	 contributors	 and	
their	 families	 could	 access	 in	 hard	 times.	 And	 underpinning	 this	 obligation	 was	 the	 vision	 of	 a	 bond	
amongst	 one’s	 ‘fellows’	 –	 a	 bond	 that,	 crucially,	 had	 as	 its	 objective	 a	 protective	 and	 compassionate	
function,	namely	the	removal	‘of	the	scandal	of	physical	want	for	which	there	is	no	economic	or	moral	
justification’.	Insofar	as	the	liberal	sense	of	social	relations	is	concerned,	through	the	provision	of	basic	
subsistence,	 the	 Report	 emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	 incentive,	 individual	 initiative,	 individual	
responsibility,	and	voluntary	action	in	its	exhortation	to	individuals	to	enhance	their,	and	their	families’,	
social	 security.	And	 in	 addition	 to	 identifying	 the	 important	 role	 to	be	played	by	 the	 State	 in	 tackling	
physical	want	and	the	other	evils	of	squalor,	disease,	ignorance,	and	idleness,	security	against	these	was	
to	 be	 ‘combined	 with	 freedom	 and	 enterprise	 and	 responsibility	 of	 the	 individual	 for	 his	 own	 life.’	
(Beveridge	1942,	para.	456)	Thus,	the	social	protection	offered	was	accompanied	by	the	State’s	interest	
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in	 shaping	 a	 particular	 type	 of	 subjectivity	 –	 one	 characterised	 by	 individual	 responsibility	 and	
enterprise.	
	
In	1949,	 seven	years	after	 the	publication	of	Beveridge’s	Report,	 T	H	Marshall	delivered	The	Marshall	
Lectures	 at	 Cambridge	 University	 (Marshall	 1992).	 Unlike	 Beveridge,	Marshall	 explicitly	 deployed	 the	
discourse	of	social	rights	in	his	now	famous	analysis	of	citizenship	and	rights	(specifically,	civil,	political,	
and	social	rights).	It	is	not	the	intention	here	to	rehearse	this	analysis,	but	simply	to	identify	a	couple	of	
pertinent	 points	 from	 Marshall’s	 reflections	 on	 the	 rights	 he	 associates	 with	 the	 social	 element	 of	
citizenship.	The	first	relates	to	his	definition	of	social	citizenship,	which	is	as	follows:	
	
By	the	social	element	I	mean	the	whole	range	from	the	right	to	a	modicum	of	economic	welfare	
and	security	to	the	right	to	share	to	the	full	in	the	social	heritage	and	to	live	the	life	of	a	civilised	
being	 according	 to	 the	 standards	 prevailing	 in	 the	 society.	 The	 institutions	 most	 closely	
connected	with	it	are	the	educational	system	and	the	social	services	(Marshall	1992,	p.	8).	
	
Marshall’s	 concept	 of	 social	 citizenship,	 and	 therefore	 of	 social	 rights,	 is	 wide-ranging.	 While	 clearly	
incorporating	what	the	Beveridge	Report	called	a	right	to	benefits	at	subsistence	level	(Marshall’s	‘right	
to	 a	 modicum	 of	 economic	 welfare	 and	 security’),	 it	 extends	 far	 beyond	 this.	 Or,	 perhaps	 better,	 it	
describes	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	 rights	 the	 latent	 aspirations	 to	 which	 Beveridge’s	 proposals	 for	 the	
abolition	of	Want	were	presumably	designed	to	give	rise.	Of	particular	note	for	this	essay,	in	this	regard,	
is	Marshall’s	idea	that	social	rights	include	the	right	‘to	live	the	life	of	a	civilised	being	according	to	the	
standards	prevailing	 in	the	society’.	For	Marshall,	 this	represented	his	 idea	of	citizenship	–	namely	the	
claim	‘to	be	accepted	as	full	members	of	the	society,	that	is,	as	citizens’.	There	is,	he	argued,	‘a	kind	of	
basic	 human	 equality	 associated	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 full	 membership	 of	 a	 community.’	 Later,	 he	
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explains	that	social	rights	‘imply	an	absolute	right	to	a	certain	standard	of	civilisation’	and	suggests	that	
the	 types	 of	 changes	 proposed	by	Beveridge	–	 including	 the	 system	of	 compulsory	 social	 insurance	 –	
enhance	 the	 prospect	 of	 a	 civilised	 life	 for	 everyone	 in	 society	 and	 reduce	 the	 incidence	 of	 risk	 and	
insecurity	for	citizens.	
	
The	 second	observation	 to	be	made	of	Marshall’s	 analysis	of	 social	 citizenship	and	 social	 rights	 is	 the	
importance	he	places,	towards	the	end	of	his	lecture,	on	the	corresponding	duties	of	citizenship	and	the	
need	to	discharge	them.	The	more	precise	of	these	–	such	as	the	duty	to	pay	insurance	contributions	–	
replicates	the	types	of	duty	Beveridge	demanded	of	citizens	 in	his	Report.	But	Marshall	also	mentions	
the	need	for	the	discharge	of	less	specific	duties.	Thus,	the	right	to	a	certain	standard	of	civilisation	is,	he	
says,	conditional	on	discharging	‘the	general	duties	of	citizenship’.	While	‘[t]hese	do	not	require	a	man	
to	sacrifice	his	individual	liberty	or	to	submit	without	question	to	every	demand	made	by	government	…	
they	do	require	that	his	acts	should	be	inspired	by	a	lively	sense	of	responsibility	towards	the	welfare	of	
the	community.’	(Marshall	1992,	p.	41)	It	is	‘the	general	obligation	to	live	the	life	of	a	good	citizen’	that	
constitutes	the	substance	of	those	wider	duties,	and	to	the	extent	that	Marshall	lends	a	more	particular	
meaning	to	such	duties,	he	says	the	duty	to	work	is	of	key	importance	in	this	respect.	This	duty	of	social	
citizenship	does	not	merely	envisage	individuals	finding	a	job	and	retaining	it;	rather,	the	essence	of	the	
duty	 is	 ‘to	 put	 one’s	 heart	 into	 one’s	 job	 and	 work	 hard’.	 And	 it	 is	 by	 engaging	 in	 this	 activity	 –	
equivalent	to	a	kind	of	service	to	the	community	and	the	nation	(although	Marshall	acknowledges	that	
there	are	problems	with	this)	–	that	citizens	will	discharge	their	general	duty	and	responsibility	towards	
the	welfare	of	the	community.	
	
What	 emerges	 from	 the	 foregoing	 analysis	 is	 how,	 for	 Beveridge	 and	 Marshall,	 social	 rights	 are	
structured	by	obligations	or	duties.	The	 right	 to	access	basic	 levels	of	money	or,	more	expansively,	 to	
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live	 the	 life	 of	 a	 civilised	 being	 are	 conditional	 upon	 discharging	 a	 number	 of	 obligations	 –	 including,	
significantly,	undertaking	paid	work.	And	those	obligations,	in	their	readings,	are	underpinned	by	a	form	
of	social	relations	based	upon	a	sense	of	solidarity	that	had	as	its	object	the	eradication	of	Want	and	the	
right	to	live	the	life	of	a	civilised	being.	Simultaneously,	one	detects	the	importance	of	a	liberal	form	of	
social	 relations	 that	 stresses	 principles	 of	 individual	 effort,	 self-responsibility,	 and	 enterprise.	 Bearing	
the	 foregoing	 analysis	 in	 mind,	 let	 us	 now	 turn	 to	 consider	 some	 of	 the	 principles	 that	 ground	
contemporary	understandings	of	social	rights	and	social	policy.	
	
Social	Rights	and	Responsibilities:	‘Third	Way’	Thinking	and	Neoliberalism	
	
The	 promotion	 of	 social	 justice	 was	 sometimes	 confused	 with	 the	 imposition	 of	 equality	 of	
outcome.	The	result	was	a	neglect	of	the	importance	of	rewarding	effort	and	responsibility,	and	
the	association	of	social	democracy	with	conformity	and	mediocrity,	rather	than	the	celebration	
of	creativity,	diversity	and	excellence.	
	
Too	often	rights	were	elevated	above	responsibilities,	but	the	responsibility	of	the	individual	to	
his	or	her	family,	neighbourhood	and	society	cannot	be	offloaded	on	to	the	state.	If	the	concept	
of	 mutual	 obligation	 is	 forgotten,	 this	 results	 in	 a	 decline	 in	 community	 spirit,	 lack	 of	
responsibility	 towards	neighbours,	 rising	 crime	and	vandalism,	and	a	 legal	 system	 that	 cannot	
cope.	
	
Modern	social	democrats	want	to	transform	the	safety	net	of	entitlements	into	a	springboard	to	
personal	responsibility.	
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(Blair	and	Schroeder	1998,	cited	in	Dardot	and	Laval	2013)	
	
What	 is	 remarkable	 about	 those	 statements,	 which	 appear	 in	 Tony	 Blair	 and	 Gerhard	 Schroeder’s	
Europe:	The	Third	Way/Die	Neue	Mitte,	 is	the	degree	to	which	they	reflect	many	of	the	principles	and	
themes	underlying	the	Beveridge	Report	and	Marshall’s	discussion	of	social	citizenship	and	social	rights.	
It	 is	remarkable	in	the	sense	that	Beveridge’s	Report	 is	often	held	out	as	exemplary	of	a	golden	era	of	
the	welfare	state	founded	on	principles	that	can	be	contrasted	with	those	underlying	‘third	way’	social	
policies.	As	I	will	demonstrate	later,	this	is	not	to	say	that	there	are	no	important	–	indeed,	fundamental	
–	differences	between	the	 two	or	 that	Beveridge	and	Marshall	would	have	approved	of	 today’s	 social	
policies;	nevertheless,	there	are	common	themes,	including	the	following:	the	need	for	a	balance	to	be	
struck	between	rights	and	responsibilities;	the	importance	of	individual	responsibility;	the	enabling	state	
(basic	state	benefits	should	facilitate	mechanisms	of	self-help);	and	the	emphasis	on	individual	initiative	
and	creativity.	The	concerns	and	issues	that	led	to	Blair	and	Schroeder’s	statements	above	are	many	and	
cannot	be	discussed	adequately	in	this	chapter.	In	what	follows,	I	will,	first,	briefly	outline	one	argument	
concerning	the	impact	of	this	philosophy	upon	the	contemporary	nature	of	social	rights.	Secondly,	I	will	
suggest	 that	 this	 philosophy	 is	 more	 adequately	 explained	 as	 deriving	 from	 neoliberalism	 and	 a	
neoliberal	 rationality.	 Finally,	with	 reference	 to	 current	 unemployment	 policy	 in	 the	UK	 and	 a	 recent	
legal	case,	I	will	analyse	how	obligations	or	duties	structure	social	rights	today	and	relate	this	back	to	the	
earlier	discussion	of	Beveridge	and	Marshall.	
	
French	 academic	 Pierre	 Rosanvallon	 has	 argued	 that,	 owing	 to	 the	 decline	 of	 traditional	 principles	 of	
social	 solidarity	 and	 the	 emergence	of	 long-term	unemployment	 and	 exclusion	 as	 core	 contemporary	
problems,	the	traditional	form	of	social	rights	within	the	welfare	state	–	that	is,	rights	to	compensatory	
benefits	–	is	no	longer	fit	for	purpose	(Rosanvallon	2000,	p.	88).	In	light	of	those	problems,	he	proposes	
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reconceptualising	 contemporary	 social	 rights	 as	 rights	 to	 ‘social	 usefulness’	 –	 that	 is,	 as	 means	 of	
ensuring	the	re-inclusion	of	 individuals	 in	society	such	that	they	do	not	simply	have	a	right	to	live	(the	
right	Rosanvallon	equates	to	the	social	right	to	benefits	of	the	classical	welfare	state)	but	‘a	right	to	live	
in	 society’.	 Social	 rights	 are	 therefore	 bound	 up	 with	 social	 participation	 and	 the	 realisation	 of	
citizenship.	 They	 have	 as	 their	 objective	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 new	 type	 of	 social	 bond	 –	 the	 re-
establishment	of	the	social	relation	for	those	currently	excluded	–	and	the	right	to	this	bond.	Beyond	the	
right	to	pecuniary	subsistence,	today’s	social	rights	incorporate	‘a	moral	imperative’	too	–	the	right	to	be	
a	socially	useful	member	of	society.	Rosanvallon	equates	the	former	right	to	passivity,	and	the	latter	to	
activity	and	the	notion	of	active	citizenship.	 In	his	view,	 this	 type	of	citizenship,	and	 its	corresponding	
right	 to	 social	 usefulness,	 form	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 new	 type	 of	 contemporary	 solidarity.	 It	 results	 in	 the	
excluded	(re-)engaging	or	participating	in	society	and	converts	the	welfare	recipients	of	the	traditional	
system	of	collective	insurance	into	citizens.	
	
This	vision	of	social	rights	in	the	‘inclusive	society’	places	individuals,	rather	than	groups	or	classes,	at	its	
core	and	envisages	an	important	role	for	obligation.	Thus,	if	social	rights	are	to	be	about	re-inclusion	in	
society,	not	only	do	we	need	to	focus	on	the	 individual	and	his	or	her	particular	needs,	circumstances	
and	behaviour	(including	its	constant	supervision);	individuals	must	become	active,	responsible	citizens	
making	and	discharging	a	series	of	commitments	too.	In	this	context,	the	notion	of	contract	becomes	an	
important	 technique	 in	 this	 reformulation	 of	 social	 rights	 in	 that	 ‘social	 rights	 are	 reinterpreted	 as	 a	
contract	articulating	rights	and	obligations.’	Rosanvallon	argues	that	these	contracts,	with	their	mutual	
set	 of	 responsibilities	 (on	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 state),	 point	 to	 a	 notion	 of	 the	 individual	 as	 ‘an	
autonomous,	 responsible	 person,	 capable	 of	 making	 commitments	 and	 honouring	 them.’	 And	 it	 is	
through	the	recognition	of	this	type	of	person	and	the	obligations	he	or	she	commits	to	undertake	that	
the	 individual	 is	 re-socialised	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 society	 is	 constructed	 and	 reaffirmed.	 Individual	
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responsibility	 is	 therefore	 an	 important	 theme	 of	 this	 philosophy;	 by	 accepting	 this	 responsibility,	
individuals	are	deemed	to	be	empowered	as	they	take	ownership	of,	for	example,	their	unemployment	
by	 actively	 adopting	measures	 to	 (re-)integrate	 themselves	 into	 the	 labour	market	 and	 thus	 society.	
Rosanvallon’s	 notion	 of	 social	 rights	 posits	 ‘a	 contractual	 individualism	 combining	 respect	 for	 the	
individual	with	the	reconstruction	of	the	social	bond.’	(Rosanvallon	2000,	p.	92)	
	
Rosanvallon’s	work	presents	an	interesting	rethinking	of	social	rights	and	the	form	that	solidarity	might	
take	in	the	context	of	contemporary	welfare	and	social	policy.	Its	underlying	philosophy	clearly	maps	on	
to	the	type	of	‘third	way’	thinking	of	Blair	and	Schroeder	set	out	above,	and	resonates	with	some	of	the	
themes	appearing	in	the	Beveridge	Report	and	Marshall’s	analysis	of	social	rights	and	social	citizenship.	
The	 focus	on	 individual	 responsibility,	 reciprocity,	 and,	what	might	 be	 taken	 to	be	 especially	 relevant	
here,	Marshall’s	 idea	of	social	citizenship	as	a	right	not	merely	to	a	modicum	of	economic	welfare	but	
extending	to	include	a	right	to	live	the	life	of	a	civilised	being	–	all	feature	prominently	in	Rosanvallon’s	
analysis.	 It	 is	suggested,	however,	 that	his	 is	a	 limited	and	sanguine	account	of	 the	transformations	 in	
the	welfare	 state	 and	 social	 rights	 that	 have	 spread	 across	 a	 number	 of	Western	 countries	 in	 recent	
decades	and	of	the	type	of	rationality	that	has	underpinned	them.	If	we	are	to	understand	the	structure	
of	social	rights	today	–	especially	the	kinds	of	obligations	that	ground	them	–	it	is	necessary	to	undertake	
a	more	critical	and	concrete	analysis.	
	
It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 problem	 ‘third	 way’	 thinkers	 and	 politicians	 had	 with	 Beveridge’s	 and	
Marshall’s	reflections	 lay	not	so	much	in	their	underlying	principles	but	 in	the	fact	that	the	strong	 link	
they	 envisaged	 between	 rights	 and	 duties	 failed	 to	 materialise	 in	 practice.	 As	 is	 clear	 from	 the	
quotations	above,	the	allegation	was	that,	while	the	welfare	state	that	developed	after	WWII	ensured	
social	 rights	 by	 providing	 access	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 protective	measures,	 it	 failed	 to	 demand	 anything	 of	
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welfare	 recipients	 in	 return.	 Along	with	 highlighting	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 increasing	 costs	 of	 welfare	 as	 a	
reason	for	rising	scepticism	about	the	welfare	state,	Pierre	Dardot	and	Christian	Laval	note	that	critiques	
of	 the	 welfare	 state	 beginning	 in	 the	 1980s	 began	 to	 represent	 this	 as	 a	 vehicle	 of	 demoralisation	
(Dardot	 and	 Laval	 2013).	 The	 bureaucratic	 welfare	 state,	 the	 argument	 went,	 and	 still	 goes	 today,	
‘destroys	the	virtues	of	civil	society	–	honesty,	the	sense	of	a	job	well	done,	personal	effort,	civility	and	
patriotism.’	 (Dardot	and	Laval	2013,	p.	164)	The	welfare	state	was	viewed	as	being	too	generous	and,	
because	of	that,	accused	of	creating	welfare	dependency	and	inertia	on	the	part	of	welfare	recipients.	
The	 incentive	 to,	 and	 passion	 for,	 work	 that	 Marshall	 identified	 as	 one	 of	 the	 general	 duties	 of	
citizenship,	 was	 nullified	 and	 welfare	 beneficiaries,	 for	 that	 reason	 amongst	 others,	 came	 to	 be	
represented	as	morally	 irresponsible.	 In	other	words,	state	benefits	may	have	provided	the	protection	
against	 the	 physical	 want,	 insecurity	 and	 risk	 that	 Beveridge	 identified	 as	 dangers;	 but	 that	 desired	
outcome	 had,	 it	 was	 argued,	 dulled	 the	 very	 initiative	 and	 individual	 responsibility	 that	 Beveridge	
believed	 his	 system	 would	 produce.	 Moreover,	 the	 ‘demoralisation’	 thesis	 could	 not	 be	 understood	
simply	as	a	moral	denunciation	of	welfare	recipients	or	in	terms	of	the	symbolic	effects	this	produced;	
additionally,	and	crucially,	it	concerned	the	erosion	of	the	types	of	principles	upon	which	the	prevailing	
economic	 system	 depended.	 As	 Dardot	 and	 Laval	 conclude	with	 regard	 to	 such	 critiques:	 ‘In	 a	word,	
social	 protection	 was	 destructive	 of	 the	 values	 without	 which	 capitalism	 could	 no	 longer	 function.’	
(Dardot	and	Laval	2013,	p.	165;	reference	omitted)		
	
Nowhere	 has	 this	 critique	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 been	 more	 influential	 and	 pronounced	 than	 in	 the	
creation	of	‘welfare	to	work’	programmes.	Such	programmes	can	be	viewed	as	having	a	dual	function:	
first,	 by	 seeking	 to	 return	 the	 unemployed	 to	 work,	 they	 aim	 to	 reduce	 costs	 and	 promote	 flexible	
labour	markets,	 thereby	 enabling	 states	 to	 remain	 economically	 competitive	 in	 an	 increasingly	 global	
marketplace	 (Jessop	 2002);	 secondly,	 through	 onerous	 sanctions	 for	 failing	 to	 participate	 in	 such	
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programmes,	they	discipline	the	unemployed,	thereby	making	them	assume	the	individual	responsibility	
that	the	welfare	state	had	allegedly	destroyed	through	its	inculcation	of	passivity.	‘Jobseekers’	were	to	
become	enterprises	in	themselves	–	entrepreneurs	who	take	responsibility	for	their	own	development,	
and	work	on	cultivating	 their	human	capital	with	a	view	to	 returning	 to	 the	 labour	market	as	 soon	as	
possible.	Social	rights	as	such	–	here,	in	the	form	of	the	jobseeker’s	allowance	(JSA)	–	did	not	disappear,	
but	access	 to	 them	was	now	strictly	 conditional	upon	 satisfying	various	 commitments	and	obligations	
set	out	in	the	type	of	contract	mentioned	by	Rosanvallon.	For	authors	such	as	Dardot	and	Laval	though,	
the	essence	of	 a	 social	policy	 like	workfare	 cannot	be	grasped	within	 the	 framework	of	Rosanvallon’s	
analysis	–	as	a	qualitative	shift	in	the	nature	of	social	rights	and	solidarity	that	promoted	the	integration	
of	the	excluded	into	society,	thereby	reaffirming	social	citizenship	and	social	bonds.	Rather,	for	them,	it	
represented	 a	 rupture	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 society,	 the	 social	 bond,	 the	 individual,	 and	 the	 governing	
rationality.	For	the	architects	of	New	Labour	and	the	third	way,	social	justice	and	the	social	bond	were	
to	 be	 re-structured	 around	 competition,	 individual	 responsibility,	 equality	 of	 opportunity,	 and	 the	
fostering	of	human	capital,	rather	than	around	‘greater	solidarity	and	objectives	of	real	equality’.	Homo	
economicus	was	no	 longer	merely	 the	creature	of	 the	market,	but	of	social	policy	 too;	and	the	state’s	
objective	 was	 no	 longer	 driven	 by	 a	 principle	 of	 protection,	 but,	 through	 ‘social	 investment’	 in	
individuals,	by	the	desire	to	ensure	their	adaptation	to	markets	and	a	market-based	society.	As	Jacques	
Donzelot	summarises:	‘[S]ocial	policy	is	no	longer	a	means	for	countering	the	economic,	but	a	means	for	
sustaining	the	logic	of	competition.’	(Donzelot	2008,	p.	124)	In	short,	the	social	policy	of	the	third	way	
had	been	defined	by	what	Dardot	and	Laval	call	a	neoliberal	rationality	and	form	of	social	relations,	the	
key	feature	of	which	‘is	the	generalization	of	competition	as	a	behavioural	norm	and	of	the	enterprise	as	
a	model	of	 subjectivation.’	 (Dardot	and	Laval	2013,	p.	4)	By	actively	embedding	 this	norm	and	model	
both	 materially	 and	 symbolically,	 the	 state	 establishes	 the	 conditions	 necessary	 for	 a	 market-based	
society.	
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Let	us	now	turn	to	consider	the	implications	of	such	developments	for	our	contemporary	understanding	
of	social	rights	and	obligation	by	considering	more	closely	the	social	policy	of	workfare	as	it	operates	in	
Britain	and	relating	this	back	to	the	rights	and	obligations	identified	by	Beveridge	and	Marshall.	
	
Workfare	in	Britain:	Transforming	Social	Rights	and	Obligations	
	
As	we	saw	earlier,	the	right	to	access	monetary	benefits	under	Beveridge’s	social	insurance	system	was	
structured	by	an	obligation	to	undertake	paid	work.	It	was	by	virtue	of	the	contribution	made	from	one’s	
salary	each	week	that	one	was	entitled	to	access	State	benefits.	The	importance	of	work	for	Beveridge,	
however,	 extended	 beyond	 the	 need	 to	 have	 already	 been	 employed	 as	 a	 condition	 of	 accessing	
benefits.	As	the	Report	noted:	‘The	correlative	of	the	State’s	undertaking	to	ensure	adequate	benefit	for	
unavoidable	 interruption	of	earnings,	however	 long,	 is	enforcement	of	 the	citizen’s	obligation	 to	 seek	
and	 accept	 all	 reasonable	 opportunities	 of	 work.’	 (Beveridge	 1942,	 para.	 130)	 Moreover,	 it	 was	
proposed	 that	 benefits	 for	 the	 long-term	 unemployed	would	 normally	 be	 conditional	 on	 attending	 a	
work	or	training	centre.	This	early	form	of	active	citizenship,	however,	was	not	novel	–	the	requirement	
that	 the	 unemployed	 should	 bear	 and	discharge	 obligations	 in	 return	 for	 receiving	 pecuniary	 support	
from	the	state	having	existed	for	some	time	already.2	But	what	can	be	said	of	this	obligation	today?	The	
contemporary	manifestation	of	 this	 requirement	 –	 the	welfare-to-work	or	workfare	 scheme	–	 is	 both	
more	onerous	 in	 the	demands	 it	makes	of	 the	unemployed	 (not	only	being	available	 for,	 and	actively	
seeking,	work;	but	in	some	cases,	actually	working)	(Freedland	et	al	2007,	p.	196)	and	more	punitive	in	
the	 sanctions	 flowing	 from	a	 failure	 to	discharge	 those	obligations.3	 In	what	 follows,	 it	will	 be	argued	
that,	despite	the	similarity	in	certain	themes	and	principles	to	be	found	in	Beveridge’s	Report	and	‘third	
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way’	 thinking	 –	 including	 reciprocity	 and	 individual	 responsibility	 –	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 obligations	
demanded	of	the	unemployed	in	return	for	JSA	is	not	in	keeping	with	other	core	principles	underpinning	
Beveridge’s	and	Marshall’s	 visions	 for	 the	welfare	 system.	Thus,	while	 the	duty	 to	work	 remains	alive	
and	well	in	the	sphere	of	unemployment	policy	today,	the	nature	of	this	duty	sheds	a	different	light	on	
the	purpose	and	 structure	of	 contemporary	 social	 rights.	Consideration	of	 a	 legal	 case	 in	England	will	
help	to	illuminate	this	argument.	
	
In	 R.	 (on	 the	 application	 of	 Reilly	 and	 Wilson)	 v.	 The	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Work	 and	 Pensions	
(hereinafter	 referred	 to	 as	 Reilly	 &	 Wilson),	 the	 claimants	 –	 Caitlin	 Reilly	 and	 Jamieson	 Wilson	 –	
challenged	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 Jobseeker’s	 Allowance	 (Employment	 and	 Enterprise)	 Regulations	 2011	
(‘the	Regulations’)	and	two	workfare	schemes	or	programmes	known	as	‘the	sbwa	scheme’	(the	sector-
based	work	academy	scheme)	and	 ‘the	CAP’	 (the	Community	Action	Programme).	 	The	sbwa	scheme,	
which	was	the	object	of	Reilly’s	challenge,	is	a	voluntary	scheme	designed	to	help	those	able	to	perform	
work-related	 activity	 and	who	 do	 not	 have	 any	 serious	 barriers	 to	 finding	work	 to	 obtain	 short-term	
work-focused	training	and	work	experience	 linked	to	a	genuine	 job	vacancy.	Her	basic	contention	was	
that	she	had	been	incorrectly,	and	therefore	unlawfully,	required	to	participate	in	the	sbwa	scheme	on	
pain	of	possibly	losing	her	JSA	entitlement	or	having	her	payments	reduced.	As	she	could	not	afford	to	
lose	her	only	source	of	income,	she	felt	she	had	no	alternative	but	to	participate.	Moreover,	rather	than	
simply	 the	 one	week’s	 “training”	 she	was	 told	 she	would	 undergo,	 she	 ended	 up	 having	 to	work	 for	
nothing	for	two	weeks	(5	hours	a	day,	5	days	a	week)	for	a	budget	retail	outlet	called	Poundland.	The	
CAP,	 the	 object	 of	Wilson’s	 claim,	 is	 a	 Programme	 for	 the	 long-term	 unemployed,	 which	 individuals,	
selected	 by	 ‘random	 allocation’,	 must	 attend	 if	 they	 wish	 to	 continue	 receiving	 JSA.	 It	 involves	
undertaking	 up	 to	 six	months’	 unpaid	work	 experience	 for	 up	 to	 30	 hours	 per	week	 and	 ‘weekly	 job	
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search	 support	 requirements’.	Wilson	 refused	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 CAP,	 claiming	 it,	 and	 his	 required	
participation,	were	unlawful.4	
	
The	 claimants’	 actions,	 which	 went	 all	 the	 way	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Court,	 were	 successful	 because	 the	
Regulations	were	found	to	have	failed	to	describe	the	relevant	schemes	or	the	circumstances	in	which	
individuals	 can	 be	 compelled	 to	 participate	 in	 them	 (as	 was	 required	 by	 the	 enabling	 Act	 (s.17A,	
Jobseekers	Act	 1995)).	 As	 a	 result,	 the	Regulations	were	 declared	unlawful	 and	quashed.	 For	 present	
purposes,	the	interest	of	the	case	revolves	around	the	claimants’	identification	of	what	they	argued	was	
the	compulsory	nature	of	 the	relevant	 law.	This	was	most	obvious	 in	 their	 final	ground	of	challenge	–	
namely,	 that	 the	 schemes	 violated	 Article	 4	 of	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights	 as	 they	
required	the	performance	of	“forced	or	compulsory	 labour”	 (Article	4(2)).	 In	 light	of	 the	nature	of	 the	
CAP	(described	above)	Wilson	argued	that	it	imposed	‘very	onerous	obligations	on	individuals’,	requiring	
them	 to	work	 for	nothing	 if	 they	wished	 to	 continue	 receiving	 JSA.	 For	 those	with	no	 savings	of	 their	
own,	the	threat	of	withdrawal	of	the	means	to	live	effectively	amounted	to	a	compulsion	to	participate	
in	 the	scheme.	Wilson	objected	to	working	 for	 free,	particularly	 for	such	a	 long	time	and	thought	 this	
was	unfair.	Reilly	argued	that	the	violation	of	Article	4	lay	in	not	being	given	‘the	option	to	participate	in	
a	scheme	that	involved	unpaid	work	for	a	private	company	and	that	the	work	she	undertook	was	under	
the	threat	of	a	penalty.’	(Reilly	&	Wilson	[2012]	EWHC	2292	(Admin),	para.	171,	per	Foskett	J)	
	
None	of	the	courts	that	heard	the	case	found	that	the	schemes	violated	Article	4.	Agreeing	with	Foskett	
J	 in	the	High	Court,	the	Supreme	Court	stressed	that	the	historical	roots	of	Article	4	 lay	in	the	need	to	
prevent	 exploitation	 of	 labour	 in	 the	 colonies.	 While	 forced	 labour	 could	 take	 different	 forms,	 its	
underlying	essence	was	exploitation,	and	a	conditional	state	benefit	such	as	JSA	‘comes	nowhere	close	
to	the	type	of	exploitative	conduct	at	which	article	4	is	aimed.’	(Reilly	&	Wilson	[2013]	UKSC	68,	para.	83)	
20	
	
The	article	would	only	be	violated	if:	1)	the	work	undertaken	was	compulsory	or	involuntary,	and	2)	‘the	
obligation	 to	 work,	 or	 its	 performance,	 [was]	 “unjust”,	 “oppressive”,	 “an	 avoidable	 hardship”,	
“needlessly	distressing”	or	“somewhat	harassing”’	 (Reilly	&	Wilson	 [2013]	UKSC	68,	para.	89).	 In	other	
words,	 the	work	or	 its	performance	needed	 to	be	exploitative.	The	 reason	advanced	 for	 the	Supreme	
Court’s	 conclusion	 on	 this	 ground	 of	 challenge	 revolved	 around	 the	 inextricable	 link	 drawn	 by	 the	
justices	between	the	state	benefit	and	the	condition	to	be	met	in	order	to	receive	this	benefit:	as	JSA	is	
designed	for	individuals	seeking	work,	the	purpose	of	the	benefit	–	to	enable	a	person	to	seek	work	–	is	
furthered	by	the	condition	of	working	or	engaging	in	work-related	activity.	As	such,	the	condition	cannot	
amount	to	exploitation.	Neither	were	the	schemes	compulsory	or	involuntary	as	the	claimants	were	free	
to	refuse	to	participate	in	them	if	they	so	wished.	Furthermore,	that	the	work	undertaken	was	unlikely,	
in	 fact,	 to	 improve	 an	 individual’s	 employment	 prospects	 was	 irrelevant	 in	 ascertaining	 whether	 the	
imposition	of	labour	as	a	condition	of	obtaining	JSA	amounted	to	forced	labour	under	Article	4.	
	
What	can	this	case	tell	us	about	contemporary	social	rights	in	the	context	of	unemployment?	And	how	
do	 these	 compare	 to	 the	 rights	 and	duties	 of	 social	 citizenship	discussed	by	Beveridge	 and	Marshall?	
First,	if,	as	we	saw	earlier,	the	right	envisaged	by	Beveridge	was	a	right	to	draw	from	the	social	insurance	
fund	 to	 which	 one	 had	 contributed	 –	 a	 right	 of	 contributors	 to	monetary	 benefits	 during	 periods	 of	
interruption	 of	 earnings	 –	 as	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 noted	 in	 Reilly	 &	 Wilson,	 the	 JSA	 is	 an	 allowance	
designed	for	people	who	seek	work,	rather	than	for	those	who	have	simply	made	financial	contributions	
to	 the	 fund.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 social	 right	 to	 the	 monetary	 benefit	 cannot	 be	 divorced	 from	 the	
obligation	 actively	 to	 seek	work	 and,	where	 demanded,	 to	 undertake	work	 as	 part	 of	 the	 process	 of	
trying	to	secure	a	paid	job	in	the	labour	market.	Of	course,	in	return	for	State	benefits,	Beveridge	spoke	
of	the	citizen’s	correlative	obligation	to	seek,	and	accept,	all	reasonable	opportunities	for	work.	But	the	
work	he	 referred	 to	was	paid	employment	within	 the	 labour	market	 –	 something	very	different	 to	an	
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obligation	 to	undertake	 the	 type	of	unpaid	work	demanded	by	 the	CAP.	 The	nature	of	 the	obligation	
underlying	the	social	right	associated	with	periods	of	unemployment	has	therefore	shifted	decisively	in	
the	direction	of	work	–	not	 in	the	sense	of	having	engaged	 in	paid	work	and	contributed	to	the	social	
insurance	fund	(although	this	is	still	 important5);	but	in	the	sense	of	actively	seeking	work,	engaging	in	
training	 activities	 designed	 to	 ready	 people	 for	 employment,	 and	 working	 for	 nothing	 while	
unemployed.	
	
Secondly,	 the	main	 objective	 of	 Beveridge’s	 Report	was	 to	 tackle	 the	 scourge	 of	Want	 –	 namely,	 the	
absence	of	 the	means	 required	 for	 individuals	 to	 live.	His	 scheme	of	 social	 insurance	was	designed	 to	
address	 the	 insecurity	and	 risk	 flowing	 from	this	 social	 reality.	There	are	 signs	 that	a	 similar	objective	
does	not	necessarily	underpin	 the	social	 right	 synonymous	with	 the	current	workfare	 system.	For	 this	
right	–	to	JSA	–	is,	at	least	partially,	built	on	the	constant	threat	to	remove	the	means	of	subsistence.	If,	
for	example,	 jobseekers	do	not	undertake	the	obligations	set	out	 in	what	 is	now	called	their	 ‘claimant	
commitment’,	 or	 fail	 to	 turn	up	 for	 an	appointment	 at	 the	 job	 centre,	or	 turn	down	a	 job	or	 training	
course,	 or	 do	 not	 apply	 for	 any	 jobs	 they	 are	 informed	 about,	 the	 sanctions	 regime	 will	 come	 into	
operation,	 progressively	 reducing	 the	 amount	 of	 JSA	 until,	 ultimately,	 it	 disappears	 completely.	What	
the	claimants	in	Reilly	&	Wilson	called	‘the	“draconian	power”	to	take	away	the	right	to	what	is,	in	many	
respects,	 a	 subsistence-level	 payment’,	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 power	 to	produce,	 rather	 than	 to	 free	
individuals	 from,	Want	 lies	 at	 the	 core	 of	 contemporary	 unemployment	 policy	 –	 something	 that	 has	
potentially	 negative	 social	 consequences	 (see,	 for	 example,	Great	 Britain:	 Scottish	Government	 2013;	
Great	 Britain:	 House	 of	 Commons	 2015).	 The	 social	 right	 associated	 with	 the	 workfare	 system	 is	
structured	in	such	a	way	as	to	be	inherently	insecure	–	that	is,	always	liable	to	be	taken	away.	
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Thirdly,	 while	 important,	 our	 comprehension	 of	 social	 rights	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 workfare	 system	
remains	 limited	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 conceptualised	 solely	 at	 the	 monetary	 level.	 Here,	 we	 can	 return	 to	
Marshall’s	 broader,	 non-pecuniary,	 understandings	 of	 social	 citizenship	 and	 social	 rights	 –	 and	 in	
particular,	 to	 his	 idea	 of	 social	 citizenship	 incorporating	 the	 right	 ‘to	 live	 the	 life	 of	 a	 civilised	 being	
according	 to	 the	standards	prevailing	 in	 the	society’,	and	 to	his	contention	 that	social	 rights	 ‘imply	an	
absolute	right	to	a	certain	standard	of	civilisation’.	To	what	extent	does	today’s	workfare	system	reflect	
those	 definitions	 of	 social	 citizenship	 and	 social	 rights?	 One	 might	 anticipate	 Reilly’s	 and	 Wilson’s	
answers	to	this	question	being:	“very	 little”.	This	was	 implicit	 in	 their	claims	that	what	the	obligations	
they	were	 being	 asked	 to	 discharge	 amounted	 to	was	 forced	 labour	 and,	 therefore,	 exploitation.	 For	
them,	there	was	something	“unjust”,	“oppressive”,	“needlessly	distressing”,	and	that	amounted	to	“an	
avoidable	 hardship”,	 in	 being	 obliged	 to	 undertake	 long	 periods	 of	 unpaid	 work	 for	 organisations,	
including	a	private	company.	
	
Relatedly,	 when	 measured	 against	 Marshall’s	 general	 duties	 of	 citizenship	 that	 he	 identified	 as	
accompanying	social	rights,	workfare	would	seem	to	fare	no	better.	It	will	be	recalled	that,	for	Marshall,	
those	 general	 duties	were	 the	 flipside	 of	 the	 right	 to	 a	 certain	 standard	 of	 civilisation.	 But	 in	 light	 of	
some	of	the	obligations	to	be	undertaken	by	 individuals	 in	return	for	JSA,	 it	 is	difficult	to	comprehend	
how	they	would	‘be	inspired	by	a	lively	sense	of	responsibility	towards	the	welfare	of	the	community’	or	
be	willing	 to	 assume	 ‘the	general	 obligation	 to	 live	 the	 life	of	 a	 good	 citizen’.	More	directly,	 it	 is	 also	
questionable	whether	Marshall’s	understanding	of	the	citizen’s	duty	to	work	holds	any	relevance	in	the	
present	context.	For	not	only	do	the	obligations	of	workfare	suggest	that	the	essence	of	his	idea	of	the	
duty	 to	work	 –	 putting	 one’s	 heart	 into	 one’s	 job	 and	working	 hard	 –	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 assumed	 and	
discharged	by	unemployed	individuals	like	Reilly	and	Wilson;6	achieving	what	Marshall	considered	to	be	
the	other,	 easily	dischargeable	 components	of	 this	duty	 (in	 light	of	 the	 context	of	 full	 employment	 in	
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which	 he	was	writing)	 –	 to	 find	 a	 job	 and	 retain	 it	 –	 looks	 increasingly	 dubious	 for	many	 involved	 in	
workfare.7	
	
Finally,	where	does	 the	 foregoing	discussion	 leave	us?	Most	 immediately,	 it	directs	us	 to	 the	possible	
relevance	today	of	the	limits	Marshall	placed	on	the	need	to	discharge	the	‘general	duties	of	citizenship’,	
including	the	duty	to	work.	For	these,	he	said,	‘do	not	require	a	man	to	sacrifice	his	individual	liberty	or	
to	submit	without	question	to	every	demand	made	by	government.’	While	the	courts	in	Reilly	&	Wilson	
denied	 the	 claimants’	 contention	 that	 the	workfare	 schemes	 amounted	 to	 forced	 labour,	 it	was	 clear	
that	 one	 of	 Reilly’s	 and	Wilson’s	 core	 reasons	 for	 so	 arguing	 was	 that	 the	 threat	 of	 removal	 of	 JSA	
effectively	 denied	 them	 the	 freedom	 to	 choose	 not	 to	 undertake	 unpaid	work.	 In	 other	 words,	 they	
argued	that,	 in	order	to	continue	receiving	subsistence	level	benefits,	they	had	no	practical	alternative	
but	 to	 submit	 to	 the	 demands	 made	 by	 the	 government.	 The	 possible	 relevance	 of	 Marshall’s	
qualification	to	the	obligation	to	discharge	the	general	duties	of	citizenship	suggests	a	tipping	point	may	
have	been	reached	in	the	duties	placed	upon	the	unemployed	today.	
	
Conclusions	
	
This	last	point	leads	to	a	few	conclusions.	First,	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	social	rights	and	
obligations	 in	 the	 context	 of	 unemployment	 policy	 has	 shifted	 in	 recent	 decades.	 As	 noted	 earlier,	
Beveridge’s	idea	of	a	social	right	involved	a	right	to	draw	a	benefit	from	a	social	insurance	fund	based	on	
the	contributions	one	had	made	to	this	through	paid	work.	The	obligation	upon	which	this	right	rests	is	
therefore	the	obligation	to	engage	in	paid	work.	The	benefit	was	to	be	set	at	subsistence	level	in	order	
to	promote	individual	efforts	to	develop	one’s	own	sources,	and	heighten	one’s	own	level,	of	security.	
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But	now	 it	 is	 this	 –	proving	one’s	 initiative,	 enterprise,	 and	 creativity,	 including	one’s	 susceptibility	 to	
undertaking	unpaid	work	–	rather	than	engagement	in	paid	work,	that	has	become	the	obligation	that	
grounds	the	right	to	JSA.	Crucially,	Beveridge’s	objective	in	recommending	a	system	of	compulsory	social	
insurance	 was	 to	 free	 the	 population	 from	Want.	 Today’s	 workfare	 system	 represents	 a	 shift	 in	 the	
settlement	between	social	rights	and	obligations	in	the	sense	that	access	to	JSA	is	premised	on	a	set	of	
obligations	 that	 are,	 at	 least	 to	 a	 degree,	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 types	 of	 obligation	 associated	 with	
Beveridge’s	 social	 insurance	 system.	Reilly	 and	Wilson	 illustrates	 this	 well	 in	 that,	 rather	 than	 access	
being	based	on	paid	work,	the	allegation	was	that	exploitation	in	the	form	of	forced	labour	founds	one’s	
right	 to	 JSA,	 and	 that	 refusing	 to	be	exploited	will	 lead	 to	a	 sanction	 that	will	 result	 in	Want	and	 the	
insecurity	and	poverty	that	are	its	symptoms.	Such	obligations	and	outcomes	are	diametrically	opposed	
to	the	principles	upon	which	Beveridge’s	Report	rested,	including	not	only	freedom	from	Want	but	the	
sense	of	solidarity	implied	by	the	institution	of	social	insurance	–	namely,	that	‘men	stand	together	with	
their	fellows’.	
	
Secondly,	 this	 suggests	 that	 the	workfare	 system	 is	 not	 primarily	 driven	 by	 a	 protective	 logic,	 but,	 as	
Dardot	 and	 Laval	 argue	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 state,	 by	 an	 adaptive	 one.	 Indeed,	 here,	 one	 can	
witness	the	development	of	a	more	fluid	relationship	between	right	and	obligation.	For	the	right	to	JSA	
is	not	equivalent	to	a	social	benefit	designed	to	modify	the	vagaries,	risks,	and	insecurities	endemic	 in	
the	 economic	 system	 –	 the	 operating	 logic	 of	 the	 classical	 welfare	 state;	 indeed,	 quite	 the	 opposite.	
Through	 the	 obligations	 demanded	 of	 participants,	 the	 right	 to	 JSA	 is	 inextricably	 bound	 up	 with	
readying	unemployed	 individuals	 for	what	 they	 can	expect	 to	 encounter	 in	 the	 contemporary	 flexible	
and	 competitive	 labour	 market	 –	 including	 temporary,	 insecure,	 low-paid,	 or	 unpaid	 work.	 The	 UK	
Government’s	 explanation	 of	 the	 rationale	 behind	 the	 workfare	 scheme	 known	 as	 Mandatory	Work	
Activity	 captures	 this	 well:	 ‘MWA	 is	 intended	 to	 help	 claimants	 move	 closer	 to	 the	 labour	 market,	
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enabling	 them	 to	 establish	 the	 discipline	 and	 habits	 of	 working	 life’	 (Great	 Britain:	 DWP	 2015).	 The	
workfare	 system	 trains	 and	 disciplines	 individuals	 in	 order	 to	 habitualise	 them	 to	 the	 reality	 of	
contemporary	 labour,	 and	 exposes	 and	 reconciles	 them	 not	 necessarily	 to	 the	 old	 virtues	 of	 social	
security	 and	 freedom	 from	Want	 that	 structured	 the	 classical	 welfare	 state,	 but	 to	 the	 ‘virtues’	 and	
characteristics	 around	 which	 the	 neoliberal	 rationality	 that	 guides	 the	 current	 political	 settlement	
revolves	–	including	insecurity,	risk-taking,	and	competition.	This	suggests	a	deeper	sense	of	obligation	
at	play	here,	deriving	from	the	idea,	 inherent	in	the	etymological	root	of	the	word,	of	a	bond	or	being	
bound.8	On	the	one	hand,	the	jobseeker	 is	trained	to	be	bound	to	the	practices	and	forms	of	 labour	–	
temporary	contracts	and	unpaid	 internships,	 for	 instance	–	typical	of	what	some	authors	have	termed	
‘the	new	capitalism’	(Sennett	2006;	Boltanski	&	Chiapello	2005).	On	the	other	hand,	he	or	she	is	bound	–	
subjected	 even	 –	 to	 a	 transformation	 at	 the	 level	 of	 subjectivity,	 to	 become	 the	 enterprising,	 self-
responsible,	risk-taker	ready	to	learn	new	skills	in	order	to	be	able	to	adapt	to,	and	compete	within,	the	
dynamic	contemporary	labour	market.	What	is	involved	here	is	a	shift	in	the	mode	of	being;	as	Dardot	
and	Laval	note:	‘at	stake	in	neo-liberalism	is	nothing	more,	or	less,	than	the	form	of	our	existence	–	the	
way	in	which	we	are	led	to	conduct	ourselves,	to	relate	to	others	and	to	ourselves.’	(Dardot	and	Laval	
2013,	p.	3;	original	emphasis)	It	is	at	this	deep	level	of	the	form	of	‘relat[ion]	to	others’	that	workfare	is	
most	revealing.	For	it	illustrates	that	this	no	longer	takes	the	form	of	Beveridge’s	notion	of	men	standing	
together	 with	 their	 fellows,	 but	 of	 the	 lone	 individual	 working	 upon	 his	 or	 her	 self	 with	 a	 view	 to	
competing	 with	 other,	 unencumbered	 individuals	 engaged	 in	 exactly	 the	 same	 activity.	 This,	 it	 is	
suggested	here,	captures	the	underlying	sense	of	Blair	and	Schroeder’s	understanding	of	the	desire	of	
modern	 social	 democrats	 ‘to	 transform	 the	 safety	 net	 of	 entitlements	 into	 a	 springboard	 to	 personal	
responsibility’.	
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Finally,	 in	 light	of	 the	discussion	 in	 this	paper,	 an	urgent	question	presents	 itself:	 To	what	extent	 is	 it	
even	 relevant	 to	 deploy	 the	 discourse	 of	 ‘social	 rights’	 as	 a	 means	 of	 comprehending	 current	
unemployment	policy	in	the	UK?	As	we	saw	earlier,	Rosanvallon	argued	that	the	old	idea	of	social	rights	
as	a	right	to	live	associated	with	access	to	compensatory	benefits	needed	updating	in	what	he	described	
as	 an	 era	 of	 long-term	 unemployment	 and	 exclusion.	 Social	 rights	 should,	 instead,	 now	 be	
conceptualised	 as	 a	 right	 to	 live	 in	 society	 –	 a	 right	 to	 social	 usefulness.	 The	 analysis	 in	 this	 chapter	
suggests	 that	 the	 type	of	 contractual	 system	he	promoted	as	 the	means	of	 realising	 this	new	 form	of	
social	right	–	the	workfare	system	–	not	only	has	dubious	success	in	re-intergating	the	unemployed	into	
society	and	establishing	for	them	a	new	social	bond;	it	also	has	the	potential	to	endanger	what	he	views	
as	the	old,	out-dated	form	of	social	right	–	the	right	to	live.	
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1	 Beveridge’s	 subsidiary	methods	 for	 tackling	Want	were	national	 assistance	 and	 voluntary	 insurance.	
The	conditions	of	social	insurance’s	success	included	the	establishment	of	a	comprehensive	health	care	
system	 (to	 keep	 the	 nation	 healthy	 and,	 thus,	 able	 to	 work)	 and	 the	 State’s	 maintenance	 of	
employment.	 In	 other	words,	 creating	 the	 conditions	 to	 facilitate	work	was	 one	 of	 the	 Report’s	 core	
objectives.	
2	 Freedland	 et	 al	 trace	 this	 reciprocal	 element	 of	 what	 they	 call	 active	 labour	market	 policies	 to	 the	
1920s.	See	Freedland	et	al	2007,	Ch.	6.	
3	The	current	sanction	regime	can	be	found	in	sections	26	and	27	of	the	Welfare	Reform	Act	2012.	
4	Unless	otherwise	indicated,	the	sbwa	scheme	and	the	CAP	will	be	referred	to	here	as	‘the	schemes’.	
5	Contribution-based	JSA	 is	 linked	to	the	amount	of	National	 Insurance	contributions	an	 individual	has	
paid	in	the	last	two	tax	years.	Importantly,	however,	access	to	this	benefit	also	depends	on	undertaking	
the	work-related	measures	stipulated	in	the	individual’s	claimant	commitment.	In	other	words,	receipt	
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of	contribution-based	JSA	is	not	solely	based	on	having	made	the	requisite	amount	of	national	insurance	
contributions.	
6	In	addition	to	claiming	that	the	obligation	to	participate	in	the	CAP	violated	Article	4,	Wilson	explained	
that	 the	work	 he	 had	 been	 given	 to	 do	 bore	 no	 resemblance	 to	 his	 specific	 needs	 and	 to	what	was	
preventing	 him	 from	 entering	 the	 job	 market.	 Similar	 comments	 by	 others	 undertaking	 workfare	
schemes	can	be	found	in	a	recent	report	commissioned	by	the	UK	Government’s	Department	of	Work	
and	Pensions:	DWP	2014.		
7	For	evidence	of	the	unstable,	low-paid,	poor	quality	jobs	that	workfare	participants	tend	to	up	in,	see	
for	example:	Carpenter,	Freda	and	Speeden	2007;	and,	Griggs	and	Evans	2010.	
8	 In	Roman	Law,	the	term	obligatio	denoted	a	tie	or	bond	between	two	parties	–	the	creditor	and	the	
debtor	–	‘by	which	one	party	was	bound,	and	the	other	entitled,	to	some	act	or	forbearance	…’	(Nicholas	
1962,	p.	158).	
